In June’s issue of The Atlantic Monthly Robert D. Kaplan argues what I have long asserted; namely that the primary long-term threat to American strategic interests is posed not by Islamic terrorists but by the rise of an increasingly powerful and aggressive Chinese superpower whose ambition to displace the United States as the world’s leading power is as obvious as it is frightening.

Of course, Kaplan focuses on an area different than one I’ve talked about. He makes the point (correctly, I assess) that our conflict with the Chinese is much more likely to take the form of a Second Cold War than it is the form of an immediate or imminent hot one. As I’ve long asserted, the real danger isn’t that the Chinese will start a war with the United States; it’s that they’ll leverage their other advantages in order to beat the United States without firing a shot.

The coming Cold War with China is, in many respects, likely to be more dangerous than that with the Soviet Union. Unlike the Russians, China is on relatively sound economic footing and possesses a political system that appears to be mostly stable. In general people, if given a choice between prosperity and freedom, will opt for the former. While democratic agitation continues on the margins in China, I don’t think it very likely that the Chinese people will choose to overthrow a system of relatively moderate authoritarianism which has brought them a level of affluence unprecedented in the history of their nation with a less stable (and likely less effective) democratic system simply because we of the West think that democracy is a positive universal ideal. The Chinese are a practical people and will, in my assessment, stick with what works over what might work.

What this means to the United States, in practical terms, is that fighting a Cold War against the Chinese requires a response far more comprehensive than that which was used in fighting the Soviet Union. It is fortunate, therefore, that the relative power of the United States has greatly increased in the years since the opening stages of the First Cold War.

In consider the Chinese Question, it is worth noting that, at this point, the US and Chinese economies are so completely interlinked that cutting off trade between them would be virtually impossible and, in any case, completely economically undesirable. This is likely to complicate things as a US-China Cold War is therefore likely to feature both military and economic “nuclear options.”

When considering this, it’s worthwhile noting that, in fact, this is a major advantage to the United States. Though the severe recession (and possible Depression) which would accompany any cut-off of US-China trade would certainly be devastating to whichever party happened to be in power at the time, it would be a shock that the American political system would weather with relative ease. If China’s political system, whose credibility is based entirely upon its economic success, could do the same is, I think, an open question.

This makes it very unlikely, for example, that the Chinese would ever actually dump the large quantities of American cash and bonds that they are presently holding onto with the desire of harming the US economy. While such a move would certainly cause severe damage to the American economy, US retaliation would equally devastate the Chinese. And, in such a situation, it would be virtually certain that, however bad the subsequent dislocations might be, in a decade or two there would still be a President in the White House and a Congress in the Capitol. Whether there would still be a Communist Party ruling China after such a crisis is much harder to assess.

In assessing the shape of any conflict with China (cold or otherwise) we must approach it from more than simply a military standpoint. The basic military dimensions of a war with China are relatively clear. A war against China is primarily a job for the Navy, with supporting roles for the Marine Corps and the Air Force.

Anything other than small-scale special operations on the Chinese mainland would, literally, be suicidal. The Army might play a role in defending, for example, Central Asia against Chinese aggression but, frankly, the logistics of anything other than a limited engagement are an absolute nightmare.

In fighting China, we’d have to rely upon the Navy to first destroy China’s fleet and prevent any advance into the Pacific and, second, to clear the way for air and missile strikes against the Chinese mainland itself while stopping most of China’s overseas trade and cutting off her energy supplies. This is important, but it is probably not enough to defeat China in and of itself.

We need to look at other theatres of operations in combating the Chinese.

First, cyber-warfare is likely to be a major component in any long-term conflict with the Chinese. China’s society is increasingly internet-dependant, just as American society is. This means that the United States will have to continue and accelerate the development of a robust cyber-warfare capability.

A lot of people underestimate the usefulness of cyber-warfare. It isn’t, to pick a few examples, simply about hacking into enemy computers or attacking websites. Cyber-warfare is a deadly combat technique with real-world applications. For example, a low-level cyber attack might disable the elevators in an extremely tall building of freeze every ATM machine in an area on a payday. A higher level attack might totally disable Air Traffic Control systems on a busy day or, alternately, hijack those systems and use them to intentionally direct planes into one another. They might even be used in concert with other methods of war. For example, a limited missile attack might be followed up upon by using cyber-warfare methods to disable every hospital near the attack or, alternately, to misdirect emergency vehicles and create massive traffic jams. Or, resources permitting, perhaps both.

Similarly, we must seek to attain command of the cultural battlefield. In the last few years I’ve been increasingly alarmed by the seemingly rising popularity of Chinese culture within the West. For example, the film Hero was both fairly popular in North America and a propaganda film produced with the support of Chinese authorities. While there’s little we can do to discourage this trend, we can seek to project it in reverse. During the early stages of the Cold War (and even later) the CIA funded a number of publications and other items designed to undermine communism. We might consider repeating this policy, with the US Government covertly offering aid to those who produce films which might be used to subvert Chinese culture.

On a similar note, in working against the Chinese, we ought also to consider the utility of working with many people who we would not care to deal with at home. Let’s face it: there aren’t likely to be many Jefferson-spouting Democrats sprouting in China anytime soon and working with violent elements (which, admittedly, I have advocated at times in the past) is likely to be counter-productive. The people who might prove most useful to us are Chinese agitators, especially of the leftist sort. As I’ve pointed out elsewhere, the blessings of China’s boom have been spread extremely unevenly and, though I have no particular objection to this, I’m certainly not above hoping that it might be exploited.

Frankly (and I doubt if I’m the only one who feels this way) I think that there’s nothing better we could do in order to slow China’s growth than to give them the twin gifts of environmental activists and labour union organizers of some considerable talent and zeal.

The awakening dragon is the greatest threat any of us has ever known. In order to combat it we must contemplate and use all options, not only the most obvious.